


## AIRPROX REPORT No 2018241

Date: 21 Aug 2018 Time: 1130Z Position: 5109N 00038E Location: Lashenden

### PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C42	PA28
Operator	Civ FW	Civ FW
Airspace	London FIR	London FIR
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	AGCS	AGCS
Provider	Headcorn Radio	Headcorn Radio
Altitude/FL	NK	NK
Transponder	A, C, S	A, C, S
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Red, White	Blue, White
Lighting		
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility		
Altitude/FL	150ft	
Altimeter	QFE	
Heading	280°	
Speed	55kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	Unknown
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	50ft V/50ft H	Not seen
Recorded	NK	



**THE C42 PILOT** reports that he joined the left-hand circuit at Lashenden for a series of touch-and-go circuits. He had just rolled and was climbing away to circuit height, passing about 150ft, when another pilot said that he was overshooting beneath him. Simultaneously, he looked down to see a low-wing, blue-and-white aircraft about 50ft below and to the left. The other aircraft subsequently pulled up and turned inside the aircraft ahead of him to go downwind. The C42 then continued his climb to circuit height. He noted that this was only his second flight in a microlight and so, on reflection, he may have been unduly worried.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'Low'.

**THE UNKNOWN PILOT** could not be traced.

### **Factual Background**

The weather at Lydd was recorded as follows:

METAR EGM D 211120Z 22016KT 9999 SCT012 23/18 Q1020=

### **Analysis and Investigation**

#### **UKAB Secretariat**

The staff at Lashenden did not witness the Airprox and so could not recall the incident. Although the radar was studied between 1015hrs and 1215hrs (in case of a time discrepancy) the Airprox could not be seen on the NATS Swanwick radar data. Furthermore, the radar could not provide data below 600ft in the vicinity of Lashenden and so it is unlikely that the incident would have been recorded. The C42 could be seen in the circuit during this period, and at 1130hrs (the reported time

of the Airprox), could be seen downwind. A blue-and-white PA28 got airborne around this time, but it was seen to depart to the west rather than turn downwind. Nevertheless, the PA28 pilot was contacted for a report and reported that he saw an aircraft touch-and-go, waited until it had climbed out, lined-up and performed checks before departing straight out to the west; the radar data supported this. Therefore, with nothing showing on the radar that fitted the description of the Airprox, the unknown aircraft could unfortunately not be traced.




Figure 1: 1130:31

The C42 and unknown aircraft pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>.

## Summary

An Airprox was reported when a C42 and an unknown aircraft flew into proximity in the Lashenden visual circuit at approx 1130hrs on Tuesday 21<sup>st</sup> August 2018. The C42 pilot was operating under VFR in VMC, and receiving an AGCS from Lashenden. The unknown aircraft pilot could not be traced.

## **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the C42 pilot and radar photographs/video recordings.

Whilst there was no doubt that the C42 pilot was concerned by what he had seen, without a radar picture or other information to throw any light on what actually took place, members simply could not come to any conclusions as to what actually happened. Although the correct colour scheme, they agreed that the PA28 pilot's report and the radar trace did not correlate with the C42 pilot's description of the incident, and so the PA28 was probably not the other aircraft involved. However, without any other information, the Board could not offer any alternative theories and so they reluctantly agreed that they could not reliably assess this incident for cause or risk.

## **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: The Board were not able to reach a satisfactory conclusion as to the cause due to a dearth of information.

Degree of Risk: D.

Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>2</sup>

The UKAB Secretariat felt that there was not enough information to assess the barriers to this Airprox.

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).